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The major thrust of insolvency reform across many jurisdictions over the last twenty years has been 
the development of legislation to both facilitate and promote business reorganizations. From Europe 
to Asia to the Pacific the notion of corporate rescue has found favour with policy makers, politicians 
and practitioners
 
2. Much of the development in this area no doubt stems from the analysis of 
Chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Code 1978 (US) and the recommendation of the Cork Report in the UK 
as regards development of a more suitable regime in that country.3 Even in the United States of 
America and Canada there have been developments in legislative provisions dealing with rescue. 
Policy bodies such as UNCITRAL and the World Bank consider such a notion as part of an effective 
insolvency regime. 4
However the recent financial crisis has raised a specific problem associated with rescue regimes. Any 
regime which involves rescue requires a degree of support from the commercial environment. That 
is, the continuation of a business in the shadow of insolvency will probably require additional funding 
and at the very least require existing creditors to postpone and/or compromise their claims. Even 
where the legislation provides for a moratorium on creditor claims, there is usually a framework in 
which liquidation can be considered an alternative. The rescue regimes may therefore be severely 
tested in situations where there is a general economic downturn such as the world has experienced 
in the last two years.  
  
Somewhat paradoxically it can be that just when rescue is needed the most, the practical reality may 
be that businesses will not be saved if there is insufficient support available either by way of 
additional credit or because other creditors are so financially stressed themselves that they are 
unable or unwilling to support any potential rescue.5
This research is aimed at evaluating the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the opportunities for 
rescue. In order to evaluate this impact we have sought the views of insolvency practitioners and 
others involved in the insolvency process. As far as we have been able to investigate, no empirical 
research has been performed using the aggregate know-how of the professionals involved in the 
rescue business internationally. Therefore, we undertook a survey of insolvency professionals across 
the world on behalf of INSOL International, the international association of restructuring, insolvency 
  
                                                          
1 The authors gratefully wish to acknowledge the energetic support of Ms. Tina McGorman from INSOL International’s 
office in London and the valuable comments received from Mr. Bob Sanderson (former INSOL President) and Mr. Adam 
Harris (INSOL Board member). 
2 See for example Franken S ‘Creditor and Debtor Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited’ (2004) 5 European 
Business Organization Law Review, pp. 645-676 at 645 where it is stated that ‘Within the European Union (EU), many 
Member States have either promulgated or are still in the process of considering the introduction of procedures designed to 
facilitate business reorganization.’; also Parry R and Zhang H., ‘China’s new Rescue Laws: Perspectives and Principles’ (2008) 
8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 113; Anderson C and Morrison D ‘The Impact of Changes to the Australian Corporate 
Rescue Regime’ (2007) 15 Insolvency Law Journal 243; Taylor L., ‘Reform of Corporate Insolvency Law: the companies 
Amendment Act 2006(NZ) (2007) 15 Insolvency Law Journal 136. 
3 The Cork Report in the United Kingdom appears to have influenced the significant development of a “rescue culture” in 
Commonwealth countries such as Australia in particular.  
4 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2004,  
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html accessed January 20, 2010. The World Bank 
Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (Revised) 2005 at p 6 Available online at 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/FINAL-ICRPrinciples-March2009.pdf accessed December 21, 2009. 
5 See for example Stapleton S, Bankruptcy and Restructuring Chapter 11 Strategies 2009: Top Lawyers on Trends and Key 
Strategies for the Upcoming Year. What Does the Current Financial Crisis Portend for Bankruptcy Reorganizations?, WL 





 The survey results will assist in gaining an understanding of how the 
prevailing economic conditions may affect outcomes or at least the perceptions about the operation 
of rescue regimes. 
2. Research questions and methodology 
The credit crunch has been seen by some as an obstacle to the access to financial facilities for 
rescuing financially troubled businesses. Our primary research question in this study is to explore, in 
the international context, the impact of the crisis on the possibilities for rescue. Objective data on 
rescue is difficult to obtain. Even where it is available there is real difficulty in making any comparison 
across jurisdictions so that its comparability can be questionable. Therefore the strategy that we 
adopted is to address the outstanding questions through the perceptions of experienced insolvency 
professionals. This was undertaken by way of a survey of all members of INSOL to whom we sent a 
series of questions by way of email. On November 6, 2009 (with reminders sent on November 18 and 
23, 2009) the membership base of INSOL International was contacted with a request for completing 
an on-line questionnaire.7 From the approximately 9300 members we received 562 complete 
responses which make a response rate of 6%.8
The survey has specifically focussed on the idea that the financial crisis has severely diminished credit 
facilities for businesses in financial difficulty despite the fact that political pressure and public opinion 
would try to save such ailing businesses in order to preserve employment. 
 To determine the characteristics of our respondents, 
we asked for their experience in years in practice [question 1], their present domicile of practice 
[question 2] and the number of recent cases involved in [question 5]).  
9
                                                          
6 See 
 The current legislative 
insolvency arrangements involve a mix of rescue and liquidation. It could be expected that no matter 
what the general financial conditions in an economy are, there will be some entities that are unable 
to be saved and there will be some that can be salvaged. However in between these positions there 
will be entities that might be saved with financial support but may fail without it. In situations where 
credit is tight even for businesses that are not insolvent it is likely that there will be little support for 
insolvent entities when economic conditions turn down. An initial question raised in the survey was 
how important rescue was as a part of the practical insolvency regime in various jurisdictions world-
wide. The survey asked whether rescue was the primary goal of insolvency proceedings in the 
relevant jurisdictions of the respondents and whether such goal changed due to the financial crisis 
[questions 3 & 4]. Where rescue has been indicated, the survey also sought to find out the reasons 
www.insol.org. During the VIIIth quadrennial INSOL World Conference in Vancouver in June 2009, INSOL International, 
approached certain members of INSOL Internationals’ Academics’ Group to discuss the possibilities of using the INSOL 
members as a source of information for both scientific research and policy reasons. Ian Fletcher, chairman of the 
Academics’ Group, together with Colin Anderson, Adam Harris and Reinout Vriesendorp to set up a pioneer working group 
for investigating and elaborating this proposition. Generous support from INSOL International has been provided especially 
by Tina McGorman.  
7 See Appendix (Table 11). 
8 The response rate may be relatively low but it can be argued that the specialist nature of the group being surveyed does 
not lead to bias in the results: see Leslie L., ‘Are high response rates essential to valid surveys?’(1972) 1 Social Science 
Research 323. Moreover, it should be noted that this response rate could be considered normal and adequate with respect 
to on-line surveys amongst a widely differentiated group of active and non-active members. 
9 The aim of preservation of employment indirectly and businesses more specifically is widely recognised as a goal of rescue 
provisions: see for example Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) Schedule B1 para 3; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 435A; in the context 
of Chapter 11 in the United States see Lubben S ‘Systemic Risk & Chapter 11’ Temple Law Review Symposium Paper, 
Unpublished available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1399015at pages 11-16. 
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(other than seeking the highest return to creditors) for pursuing that goal [question 6] and to 
investigate the sustainability of the rescue over time [question 7]. Subsequently, we returned to the 
initial question as to whether and if so, why it has become more difficult to obtain adequate credit 
facilities to rescue viable business since the beginning of the financial crisis [questions 8 & 9].  
By using this method of on-line questioning of a global professionally involved population, we have 
accessed an important source of information; however, we must qualify our findings in two respects. 
First, the nature of the questions and the wide variety of jurisdictions of the respondents result in a 
set of responses on a highly aggregate level. Detailed comparable results cannot be retrieved from 
the data set obtained. There is a danger that the factors of influence in a particular jurisdiction will be 
idiosyncratic so that attempting to draw a broad conclusion will be misleading. We argue however 
that the nature of the questions asked has minimised this risk. Second, as with all survey data, the 
responses reflect the reality as observed and perceived by the insolvency professionals, based on 
their own skills and experiences and their professional judgement. Their responses are undoubtedly 
influenced and coloured by their training, biases and beliefs. At the same time it must be recognised 
that the professionals that we surveyed are at the forefront of the response to insolvency. 
Accordingly it is their beliefs that will significantly influence or perhaps determine how a particular 
entity responds to insolvency. Consequently we would argue that in many ways it is their action that 
creates the reality of the response to the financial crisis.  
In the next paragraph (§ 3) we first describe our sample of respondents based on their answers to 
questions 1, 2 and 5. The subsequent paragraph (§ 4) deals with the results of the survey on the 
questions we posed with regard to the impact of the financial crisis. In this respect we have noted 
that an overwhelming majority (strongly) agreed with the statement that the credit crunch had a 
negative impact on the prospects of restructuring (questions 8 & 9). We also asked the respondents 
whether or not they had observed a change in attitude towards the preference of rescue over 
liquidation as a result of the financial crisis (questions 3 & 4). To the extent rescue of the business has 
been the primary goal of the restructuring process, the respondents were asked for the reasons 
(question 6). Finally, we describe the sustainability of a rescue where we distinguish between short 
and long term survival (question 7). We conclude the results of the survey in the last paragraph (§ 5) 
where we also present some recommendations for further research. 
 
3. Characteristics of the respondents by geography, legal system and professional experience 
In total the survey collected 562 respondents from INSOL members from 56 countries. This group 
was analysed as to their origin per country/continent, legal system and their professional experience.  
a. Geographical origin of the respondents 
As can be seen in Table 1 of the Appendix, the distribution is unequal – 439 (almost 80%) of the 
respondents come from 10 countries, reflected in Table 1 below. This resembles to some extent the 
nature of membership of INSOL International.  
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Table 1: Distribution by 10 mostly mentioned countries (n=439) 
 
 Country Responses Percent 
1 United Kingdom 95 16,90 
2 Australia 89 15,84 
3 Canada 66 11,74 
4 Netherlands 52 9,25 
5 United States 37 6,58 
6 New Zealand 31 5,52 
7 Hong Kong 29 5,16 
8 South Africa 16 2,85 
9 Germany 12 2,14 
10 India 12 2,14 
 
After controlling for continent10
b. Legal system of the respondents 
 we see that 38% of the respondents reside in Europe, 22% in 
Australia/Oceania, 19% in North America, 11% in Asia, 5% in Africa and 4% in South America. The 
representation whilst uneven does encompass countries representing several of the important 
economies in terms of economic activity. 
We have utilised the classification of the legal systems from the JuriGlobe project of University of 
Ottawa.11
Table 1
 Most of the responses come from countries with a common law legal system. This trend is 
apparent from 1 (see Appendix) – apparently the respondents from the UK, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the US dominate the dataset. Every fourth respondent practices law in a country 
which is described as civil law (the classification does not distinguish between Napoleonic and 
German trends within the civil law). Some 15% of the respondents originate in jurisdictions defined 
as mixed.  
An alternative way to classify legal regimes with respect to insolvency is to evaluate whether the 
particular regime is more favourable to debtors or to creditors. It is not within the scope of this paper 
to develop or debate the criteria surrounding how insolvency regimes may be classified on the 
basis.12 In order to provide some insight we adopt the classification of Philip Wood.13
                                                          
10 Classification from 
 He uses five 
criteria to assess to what extent the rescue of a financially troubled business affects the interests of 
http://www.worldatlas.com/cntycont.htm. 
11 http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/syst-demo/index-alpha.php. 
12 We recognise the limitations in attempting to make such classifications which are inevitably somewhat arbitrary but note 
that questions of appropriate bankruptcy policy are key economic issues in any economy: see for example Bickerdyke I., 
Lattimore R., and Madge A., Business Failure and Change: An Australian Perspective Productivity Commission Staff Research 
Paper, Canberra 2000 available at http://www.pc.gov.au/research/staffresearch/bfacaap/bfacaap.pdf; White M ‘The costs 
of corporate bankruptcy: A U.S. – European comparison’, in Bhandari, J.S. and Weiss, L.A. (eds), Corporate Bankruptcy, 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 467–500 
13 Wood Ph., Maps of World Financial Law, 6th edition , 2007, Sweet & Maxwell, London, p. 149, figure 43 
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the creditors. We use a simple system of scoring and aggregation to come to an ultimate index to 
rank a legal system on this basis.14









c. Professional experience of the respondents 
Most of the respondents in the survey report significant experience in the field of insolvency law. 
Almost 61% of all respondents have worked for more than fifteen years as insolvency practitioners. 
Experience between five and fifteen years have another 30% of those who completed the survey. 
Less than 10% have relatively little experience with less than five years in practice.  
Tables 2 and 3 provide further insight into the level of professional experience of the respondents. 
Table 2: Specialization in insolvency law in the 10 best represented countries (n=439; cell values are percentages) 
  0 0-4 years 5-9 years 10-15 years > 15 years 
 Australia 1 1 7 15 76 
 Canada 3 3 11 14 70 
 Germany 0 8 17 25 50 
 Hong Kong 0 24 21 14 41 
 India 8 8 25 25 33 
 Netherlands 2 2 27 8 62 
 New Zealand 3 26 16 19 36 
 South Africa 0 0 38 6 56 
 United Kingdom 4 1 8 10 77 
 United States 3 3 14 14 68 
 
There are small differences in the extent of specialization by type of legal system. On average the 
respondents from the common law countries have slightly more experience than their counterparts 
                                                          
14 Apart from the subjective boundaries of such a scoring, an additional limitation is that Wood’s the classification covers 
only 13 countries (for details on the scoring and distribution of the scores see Appendix Table 14). 
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in the civil law countries. Those, who practice in jurisdictions with mixed systems, tend to have a little 
less experience in the field of insolvency.  
Table 3: Specialization in insolvency law by legal system (n=55215
  
) 
  N/A 0-4 years 5-9 years 10-15 years > 15 years Total 
Common law 
  9 14 35 45 230 333 
  2,7% 4,2% 10,5% 13,5% 69,1% 100,0% 
Civil law 
  3 8 31 20 73 135 
  2,2% 5,9% 23,0% 14,8% 54,1% 100,0% 
Mixed 
  2 11 21 17 33 84 
  2,4% 13,1% 25,0% 20,2% 39,3% 100,0% 
 
Table 4 shows the approximate number of insolvency cases taken by the respondents since 2004. 
Additional break down of the results by country is available in Table 5. When interpreting the data 
one should be careful not to make extensive inferences about the experience levels of the insolvency 
practitioners in the corresponding countries. Again this may be reflective of the fact that INSOL 
International’s membership consists of experienced professionals. 
Table 4: How often have you advised and assisted business in financial trouble since 2004? (n=562) 
 Percent 





> 200 11,6 
Total 100 
 
Table 5: How often have you advised and assisted business in financial trouble since 2004 by the 10 best represented 
countries? (n=439; cell values are percentages) 
  N/A 0-20 21-50 51-100 101-200 > 200 
Australia 0 27 42 18 8 5 
Canada 0 59 21 7 10 3 
Germany 0 37 33 21 8 2 
Hong Kong 3 16 21 17 14 30 
India 5 25 21 26 11 12 
Netherlands 6 44 38 13 0 0 
New Zealand 7 26 23 19 10 16 
South Africa 8 8 17 17 25 25 
United Kingdom 8 42 17 8 8 17 
United States 11 38 24 19 3 5 
 
                                                          
15 See note 22 Appendix Table 12 on the unclarity concerning 10 respondents from Afghanistan. 
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4. Restructuring: the impact of the Credit Crunch 
One of the important requirements for recovering businesses is the access to finance.16 Successful 
restructuring is dependent on two factors – meeting the liquidity needs and obtainment of 
postpetition financing. Metaphorically Westbrook and Gottlieb put the relationship between access 
to financial facilities and restructuring as: “Liquidity is the lifeblood of reorganization”.17 The major 
purpose of reorganization is to protect viable but distressed companies and thus to realize the 
interests of the concerned parties through healing of the business entity. In order to continue its 
business operations and pay debts as they come due, a company in restructuring often needs to 
secure substantial amounts of additional liquidity and capital. In times of financial crisis and credit 
crunch the difficult goal to convince the lenders in the viability of the distressed company becomes 
even harder if not impossible. Stephen C. Stapleton18 outlines several reasons for the drainage of 
financial facilities which used to help distressed companies before 2007. As most significant are 
depicted 1) the deleveraging of hedge funds, which were the main sources of investment in large 
insolvency cases under the US Chapter 11 and 2) the increased costs of capital. In result “more 
companies that file for bankruptcy shutting down simply because they cannot obtain the financing 
necessary to operate during their reorganization.”19
a. Since the beginning of the financial crisis, it has been much more difficult to obtain adequate 
credit facilities to rescue viable financially troubled businesses; if so, what are the reasons? 
(questions 8 & 9) 
  
How do the respondents of our survey see the impact of the credit crunch on the prospects for 
restructuring? Conventional wisdom would suggest that financially troubled businesses have had 
their ability to access additional credit negatively impacted by the financial crisis of 2008-and 2009. 
This view is firmly supported from the data in Table 6. Less than 3% of all respondents disagreed with 
the statement and only 7% were neutral about it. With such an overwhelming agreement with the 
statement, one cannot anticipate differences by professional experience of the respondent, country, 
legal system or continent. 
Table 6: It is more difficult now to obtain financial facilities to rescue viable business (n=562) 
  Percent 




Strongly disagree ,2 
Don't know 2,0 
                                                          
16 For example Platt suggests it is one of the three fundamental requirements for a successful turnaround: Platt Principles of 
Corporate Renewal (2nd ed., University of Michigan Press, 2004) at 140. 
17 Westbrook J & Gottlieb L, Reorganizations, Exemption of Financial Assets, 27 American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 
10(2009). 
18 Stapleton S, Bankruptcy and Restructuring Chapter 11 Strategies 2009: Top Lawyers on Trends and Key Strategies for the 
Upcoming Year. What Does the Current Financial Crisis Portend for Bankruptcy Reorganizations?, WL 531544 Aspatore 
1(2009).  
19 Stapleton S, Bankruptcy and Restructuring Chapter 11 Strategies 2009: Top Lawyers on Trends and Key Strategies for the 
Upcoming Year. What Does the Current Financial Crisis Portend for Bankruptcy Reorganizations?, WL 531544 Aspatore 




In Figure 2 we see that the agreement to the statement is not conditioned on the type of legal 
system. Insolvency practitioners from countries with common law, civil law or mixed legal systems 
largely agree that the credit crunch significantly reduced the availability of financial resources 
needed to rescue and stabilize troubled business. 
Figure 2: It is more difficult now to obtain financial facilities to rescue viable business (by legal system; n=562) 
 
Further on, we look at the relationship between the financial crisis and the access to financial 
resources for rescuing viable companies at national level. Due to data constraints we limit our 
observations to the 10 countries with most respondents. As Figure 3 indicates there is some 
variability but the general trend holds – the interviewed insolvency practitioners share the view that 
the credit crunch has limited the possibilities for obtaining financial resources for rescuing troubled 
debtors. Variations could be sought in two directions. First, the respondents in some countries are 
more willing to choose the option strongly agree to the statement that the financial crisis and the 
related lack of capital impacts negatively restructuring as a goal of the insolvency proceedings. 
Notably the respondents from the US seem to be hugely convinced that the statement is true (65% 
strongly agree). By comparison, their Canadian colleagues favour the option ‘agree ‘(60%). It is 
difficult to draw any conclusion from these distributions but that the respondents from all of the 
analyzed countries agree with the statement although in different degree. However, one could argue 
that there appears to be some correlation between the degree of decline of the financial system (US 
and UK) as compared to the ability to have access to funds. A second direction for exploring the data 
in Figure 3 is to look for countries in which there is a visible disagreement or at least neutrality 
towards the statement. A particularly notable exception is India where about 36% of the respondents 
are neutral or disagree that after the credit crunch financial facilities are more difficult to obtain for 

















Figure 3: It is more difficult now to obtain financial facilities to rescue viable business (by country; n=439) 
 
There is no correlation between the estimated index of creditor-friendliness and the perceived 
access to financial facilities for rescuing financially troubled business after the financial crisis of 2008. 
This suggests that the factor is unrelated to the type of insolvency regime that exists in the 
jurisdiction. The implications are that financial assistance to troubled companies would appear to be 
determined more by general economic conditions than by the type of insolvency regime available. 
This is not an unexpected finding – the barriers to obtaining financial facilities do not originate in the 
insolvency system and have very little to do with its philosophical grounds. 
Figure 4 shows to the relationship between the professional experience of the respondent and his or 
her agreement with the statement. More experienced respondents tend to agree more that it is 
more difficult now to obtain financial facilities to rescue viable business. 
Figure 4: It is more difficult now to obtain financial facilities to rescue viable business (by professional experience; n=562) 
 
We specifically asked for the reasons why there has been a reluctance to provide adequate financing 
to businesses in financial distress. Almost 300 respondents provided insight why according to their 
specific knowledge of cases it has become more difficult to obtain such financing facilities. Table 7 
























> 15 years 
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It is interesting to see that according to the respondents the most important reason for the decrease 
in credit availability has been the change in bank policy as to its willingness to lend money. While 
credit was abundant in the period 2004-2007, it became a very scarce commodity after 2007. Even 
clients in good standing have had difficulty in obtaining additional funding for financially solid 
projects. This group is faced with banks that are orientating themselves in view of rapidly changing 
market conditions. As long as the prospects remain unclear, the banks are unwilling to fund viable 
distressed businesses. It seems also political, public and regulatory attention to the role of the banks 
initiating the financial crisis, has led them to tighten their lending policy. In addition to the 
unwillingness of financial institutions to support business in financial difficulties, 40% of the 
respondents who gave specific reasons noted that also the unavailability of credit appears to be a 
major hurdle for them to attract fresh money for restructuring: almost 25% mentioned the decrease 
of the credit market as an important reason. 17% had the opinion that the unavailability of credit was 
a result of financial problems of the existing provider of credit itself. 
Table 7: Reasons why it has become more difficult now to obtain financial facilities to rescue viable business (n=297) 
 Reason Percent 
Choice of the banks to restrict its credit facilities 
to prime debtors 
30 
Banks are nervous about market conditions and 
prospects 
25 
Lack of financing opportunities; restriction of 
number of financial investors/banks 
23 
Banks have financial problems themselves 17 
Political or regulatory restrictions 5 
 
The responses on the question from Table 7 could be grouped analytically into two large categories. 
We could call the first category objective because it attributes the cut of financing for rescue to 
environmental factors. “Less money is available” is the most often explanation of the shrink of 
financial facilities needed for rescue. Some of the respondents elaborate on the changed structure of 
the supply market of distress finance: “… hedge funds disappeared, credit markets (e.g. 
securitization) closed for most of the period“. Yet another theme of the objectivist view is the change 
in the national and international regulations (specifically the Basel II Framework) which imposed 
tough restrictions to the lending industry. The process of bailing out (a respondent refers to the 
process as “nationalization”) of the main lenders in the US and the withdrawal of major funding 
packages from the market is an example of country-specific environmental reason for the 
evaporation of funding for distressed businesses. 
There is a wide spread agreement that the financial crisis creates structural impediments for rescuing 
viable business. However, the interviewed insolvency professionals are far from concluding that it is 
all about the crisis. The strategies and behaviour of the banks is the second outstanding category 
identified by the respondents. There is a clear partition in the attitudes towards the role of the 
banks. The majority of the interviewed tend to view critically the pre- and post- decisions of the 
bankers. “Banks themselves were in trouble and have become much more prudent in funding 
companies.” This is a frequent implication – the banks were overexposed to risk and the current 
practices are just the return of the pendulum. In that regard a respondent recommends “a total 
reversal of credit profiling to 1980s/90s prudence.” 
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Related reason is the acute risk aversion of the banks. In a more astute language it was put as “Banks 
have become very shy.” However, there is a negative sentiment in this statement. The banks are not 
only risk averse but rely upon “unregulated credit scores and credit scoring techniques” instead 
looking for sound advice from accountants and insolvency practitioners. At the next level of criticism, 
some of the respondents question the capacity and willingness of the bankers to understand the 
business of their clients. “Bank professionals are protecting themselves against public opinion and 
are not trained business people/entrepreneurs.” “I have found that they are reluctant to know their 
customers or understand their businesses”. Bureaucracy attitudes of bankers towards the needs of 
the business are tones from the same stream of criticism. An interesting comment goes against some 
insolvency practitioners who opt for taking “the easy route and advise the banks to enforce their 
security”. More general comments about the failing of the banks to respond properly point to their 
inability to react adequately to the financial crisis: “The banks have not been equipped to deal with 
the crisis”. 
There are also exonerating views on the role of the banks as it comes to the lack of financial facilities 
required for rescue. Many respondents comment on the pressure on the banks to shift from security 
based to profitability lending. As many businesses find themselves in trouble and the asset values 
plummeting the banks are under strenuous pressure against extending credit to risky businesses. 
“Banks are overcautious, they insist on massive security which a client, who is already distressed, 
cannot provide.” Experience with failure in funding the restructuring of bankrupt companies is 
another powerful frame of reference. Finally, another reason for the banks to limit the amount of 
credit to troubled business can be found in the new regulatory requirements. 
b. Based on your general knowledge and experience, indicate on the scale below your opinion of the 
following statement for the period 2004-2007 resp. mid-2007 until now: “In practice, in most 
cases the rescue rather than the liquidation of businesses in financial trouble in your country has 
been the primary goal of the insolvency proceedings”? (questions 3 & 4) 
More interesting is the question about the role of the financial crisis on the restructuring of 
financially troubled business. Two contradictory hypotheses are plausible: 1) in time of limited access 
to financial facilities, restructuring is a desirable but difficult to accomplish goal and 2) due to the 
restrained access to resources, creditors are wary about the recovery of their debts through winding 
up. In the survey, we asked the respondents about their view on the desirability of restructuring 
before and after the start financial crisis in mid-2007. Figure 5 shows that there are negligible 
differences in the perceived intention to rescue the troubled business before and after the financial 
crisis. Apparently the credit crunch did not change notably the perceived importance of rescue as the 
desired outcome of insolvency proceedings as far as the professionals surveyed were concerned. 
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Figure 5: In practice, in most cases the rescue rather than the liquidation of businesses in financial trouble in your 
country has been the primary goal of the insolvency proceedings (n=562)? 
 
Table 8 shows how the respondents from the 10 countries with most respondents assess the role of 
rescue before and after the financial crisis. In the second and the third column are the mean scores 
of the questions that asked respectively about the periods 2004-2007 and after 2007. Lower values 
indicate agreement whereas high values speak of disagreement. For instance if the value for 2004-
2007 is 2 and for the next period is 3, the interpretation should be that rescue in the first period has 
been more desirable. In the last column of the table we see the direction of the difference – a 
positive sign (+) which means that on average the respondents from the particular country thought 
that after the crisis rescue was a more sought after outcome of insolvency proceedings. A negative 
sign (-) indicates the opposite – after 2007 the importance of rescue as a primary goal was declining. 
In all of the 10 countries there is a difference in the mean scores of the two periods. This difference, 
however, could be due to sampling error and/or the subjective character of the measuring scale 
(from strongly agree to strongly disagree). In order to check the robustness of the differences we 
performed statistical analysis20
Table 
 which indicates which pairs could be ‘trusted’ and which not. For the 
rows of  highlighted in grey we cannot be reasonably certain that the difference is not due to 
sampling or measurement error. In the remaining four rows (Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand and 
the US) the difference is negative. This means that the interviewed insolvency professionals think 
that after 2007 rescue is losing to certain degree its importance of a primary goal of the insolvency 
proceedings.  
 
                                                          














Mid 2007 to now
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Table 8: In practice, in most cases the rescue rather than the liquidation of businesses in financial trouble in your country 
has been the primary goal of the insolvency proceedings (n=439)? 
 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Difference 
Australia 2,85 2,5 - 
Canada 2,14 2,38 + 
Germany 2,42 2,08 - 
Hong Kong 3,28 3,07 - 
India 2,33 2 - 
Netherlands 3,52 3,44 - 
New Zealand 3,45 3,13 - 
South Africa 3,81 3,44 - 
United Kingdom 2,35 2,36 + 
United States 2,42 2,08 - 
 
The data shown in Table 8 could be used for a different type of analysis. It could reveal the general 
attitude towards the place of rescue in the hierarchy of intended goals of the insolvency law. In some 
countries (i.e. US, UK, India, Canada and Australia) there is a prevalent feeling among the insolvency 
practitioners that the principle goal of the insolvency law is to provide business rescue. Respondents 
from other countries (i.e. Netherlands, Hong Kong and to some extent South Africa) are more 
sceptical about the possibility of rescuing the troubled debtor. 
c. Based on your specific knowledge of cases and experience, were the following reasons significant 
to the rescue of the businesses, apart from seeking the highest return to creditors? (question 6) 
After reviewing the general perceptions about rescue it is tempting to look at the specific reasons 
that drive the insolvency procedure towards preference of restructuring to liquidation. In our 
questionnaire we specified four possible options for rescuing a business – 1) to save employment; 2) 
to save tactical/strategic know-how; 3) to satisfy politicians/public opinion and 4) to keep 
“owner”/management in place. Figure 6 suggests that saving employment is the most compelling 
reason for rescuing troubled businesses. Saving tactical and strategic knowledge is the second most 
influential motivation for avoidance of liquidation. Almost at the same level the respondents place 
the motivation to keep the “owner” or management of the insolvent entity. Clearly, the political 
motivation is not really seen as the major driver towards business rescue.  
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Figure 6: Reasons for rescue (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=neutral; 4= disagree; 5=strongly disagree; n=562) 
 
Do the results differ by legal system or continent? Figure 7 suggests evidence that the differences 
among the legal systems are marginal. In all three, the major reason for rescuing financially troubled 
business is to save employment. If there are differences, we can argue that these are small in 
absolute numbers and not really significant in terms of explanatory power. For instance, in the 
countries with mixed legal systems, the compliance with non-legal or business arguments such as 
politics or public opinion plays more pronounced role. It is not a surprising finding – the GDP per 
capita of the countries with mixed legal system (represented in our sample) is 6 times lower than 
that of the common law countries and 5 times lower than civil law countries. Of course, economic 
development alone cannot explain well the role of the extra-legal factors in the insolvency 
procedures. However, one possible explanation is that countries that are less developed 
economically may also tend to have weaker institutions that undergird the rule of law.  
Figure 7: Reasons for rescue by legal system (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=neutral; 4= disagree; 5=strongly disagree; 
n=562) 
 
Figure 8 demonstrates the distribution of reasons for rescue by continent. Apparently, even if the 




































rescue to liquidation. More significant variation is evident by continent when considering the political 
and owner/managerial reasons. The respondents from South America are more willing to think that 
rescue is appealing for political and public opinion reasons. On the other hand, this reason is less 
salient in the European countries. Another noteworthy difference is that the insolvency professionals 
from Africa are significantly less likely to think that the reason for rescue is to keep the “owner” or 
management in place. 
Figure 8: Reasons for rescue by continent (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=neutral; 4= disagree; 5=strongly disagree; n=562) 
 
d. Based on your specific knowledge of cases, the rescue of businesses (either in whole or in 
part) has been mostly successful (i.e. that the business substantially survived its own financial 
difficulties) in the following year and/or also after a couple of years? (question 7) 
After reviewing the use of rescue and the main motivators behind it, we surveyed the practitioners 
about its sustainability. With two questions we asked the respondents about their perceptions on the 
viability of rescue in the longer and shorter term. Table 9 shows that in fact in shorter term and 
longer term success of rescue is seen in somewhat similar way.  
Table 9: Viability of rescue over time (n=562); cell values are percentages) 
 
Rescue successful - in the following year Rescue successful - after a couple of years 
Strongly agree 7,65 4,90 
Agree 43,14 45,29 
Neutral 22,94 23,53 
Disagree 21,18 18,24 
Strongly disagree 2,55 3,73 
Don't know 2,55 4,31 
 
Breaking down the responses by legal system reveals some variance. In civil law and common law 














A somewhat different picture emerges in the groups of countries, which legal systems are described 
as of mixed character. As figure 9 demonstrates, rescue in the short term in these systems has been 
seen as less successful than the long term. Apparently, in the mixed legal systems, the rescue 
appears to be more sustainable than in de in the common law jurisdictions. 
Figure 9: Viability of rescue by legal system (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=neutral; 4= disagree; 5=strongly disagree; 
n=562) 
 
In addition we looked at the distribution of the perceived viability of rescue in the 10 most 
represented countries. The general finding that there are no significant differences between the 
shorter and the longer term holds at this level. However, a closer inspection reveals that in some 
countries the respondents agreed more with the first statement (rescue is successful in the following 
year) than with the second (rescue is successful after a couple of years). Examples of such countries 
are Germany, Canada, United Kingdom and the US. Long term viability seems more applicable in 
Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, South Africa and India. 
Table 10: Viability of rescue in 10 best represented countries (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=neutral; 4= disagree; 
5=strongly disagree; n=439) 
 
Rescue successful - in the 
following year 
Rescue successful - after a 
couple of years 
Sustainable 
rescue over time? 
United Kingdom 2,38 2,63 - 
Australia 2,71 2,67 + 
Canada 2,39 2,69 - 
Netherlands 2,63 2,63 o 
United States 2,29 2,68 - 
New Zealand 2,96 2,85 + 
Hong Kong 3,19 2,92 + 
South Africa 3,33 3,08 + 
Germany 1,92 2,73 - 
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The vast majority of the interviewed insolvency professionals agree that the credit crisis that 
commenced in 2007 stifled the access of distressed business to financial facilities so needed for 
successful restructuring. This accord holds across legal systems, continents, countries or professional 
experience of the respondents. The implication is clear: the financial crisis retrenched the access to 
financial facilities and thus impacted negatively the prospects for preventing or even ending the 
bankruptcy procedure with reorganization instead of winding up of the estate assets. Several reasons 
have been pointed out by the insolvency professionals. First, there is the objective decrease of cheap 
and liquid financial resources. The traditional funders of distressed business – banks and hedge funds 
– are in financial troubles themselves and apply more selective and cautious risk management rules. 
Furthermore, the banks nowadays operate under more rigid public policies and the political and 
public expectations are for prudency and restraint. Financing of restructuring may be high risk and on 
the one hand, the insolvency professionals see in their practices that the banks do not welcome this 
risk. On the other hand, they also think that the banks are overly risk aversive and eager to show 
constraint. Some of the respondents even think that as the bankers failed to recognize the symptoms 
of the credit crunch, they nowadays have become short-sighted to recognize the long term interests 
of their clients. It should be noted that this study did not investigate the practices of business 
restructuring outside the bankruptcy proceedings. For a better assessment of the role of the lenders 
(banks) in the current practices of restricting credit availability, we suggest that further research 
explore the informal restructuring, its outcomes and (dis)advantages. 
Even in the times of easy access to cheap credit, restructuring has been a relatively rare and 
uncertain event. Although the insolvency professionals are unanimous that now it has become 
difficult to find post-petition funding, there is no agreement how this impacts the chances of 
restructuring. The research shows the professionals from some countries think that rescue is less 
desirable as an outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings now. Others are in favour of the opposite 
opinion – restructuring is more attractive outcome in the times of financial crisis. Yet, respondents 
from other countries do not see significant impact of the crises on the desirability of restructuring. 
This division could be explained with structural differences in the way that the financial crisis 
emerged and developed in the studied countries. Another factor could be the role of insolvency and 
namely of rescue in the business environment in the particular jurisdictions. 
The research also shed light on the reasons for rescue as they are seen by the insolvency 
professionals. Saving employment has been specified as the most persuasive motive for restructuring 
distressed business. This finding is not surprising – we are witnessing massive efforts on behalf of 
some governments to save jobs. These efforts, however, are usually targeted at big corporations with 
many employees. It would be interesting to control in further research for the size of the bankrupt 
entities. Small and medium sized companies are less often rescued through restructuring and 
perhaps there are other reasons and motives to do so. This analysis could be extended in further 
research also to the viability of the rescue. We found that there is no clear trend when the rescue 
becomes success or failure – in the year following the decision of the bankruptcy court or in the next 
couple of years. It is likely that the different insolvency system nurture different outcomes. Or it 
could be that viability of rescue is dependent on the characteristics of the debtor, on its creditor or 
on a combination of all these factors. More targeted research could enrich the results of the current 




Table 11: Questionnaire 
INSOL SURVEY 2009 
 
Dear INSOL member,  
 
The board of INSOL International kindly requests you to take a small amount of your time to answer the 
questions of the following survey. The survey will be most effective if you respond to the questions no later 
than November 23, 2009.  
 
INSOL International - Academics' Group 
INSOL SURVEY 2009 
 
Since the current financial crisis began to emerge in the second half of 2007, there has been commentary that 
the financing available to troubled businesses, both during and after a restructuring has been constrained or 
the product of different motivations, and that this has given rise to differences between the position taken by 
banks and other financiers and that taken by governments, politicians, media and the general public with 
respect to the availability of funds for restructuring and rescuing businesses. INSOL International is conducting 
a short survey on this subject in order to clarify current professional opinion on this matter so that we can 
inform relevant parties accordingly. The board of INSOL International encourages its members to contribute to 
the survey below which has been set up in close cooperation with INSOL International’s Academics' Group.  
This survey has been designed to take up no more than five minutes of your time. The outcome will be 
communicated to important decision makers, such as governments, policymakers, financiers and to business 
communities around the world, as well as directly to members of INSOL International.  
Thank you for your input. There are 11 questions in this survey. 
 
1. How many years have you been working in insolvency practice? 
o 0-4 years 
o 45-9 years 
o 10-14 years 
o 15 years and more 
o no answer 
[Please indicate the aggregate number of years that you have been involved in insolvency matters as a lawyer, accountant, 
judge, regulator, academic or otherwise.] 
 
2. Where do you practice insolvency law?  
 
[Check the country that you consider your 'home' country with respect to your activities in insolvency law.] 
 
3. Based on your general knowledge and experience, indicate on the scale below your opinion of the 
following statement for the period 2004-2007: In practice, in most cases the rescue rather than the liquidation 
of businesses in financial trouble in your country has been the primary goal of the insolvency proceedings. 
Choose one of the following answers: 




o strongly disagree 
o don’t know 




4. Based on your general knowledge and experience, indicate on the scale below your opinion of the 
following statement for the period mid-2007 until now: In practice, in most cases the rescue rather than the 
liquidation of businesses in financial trouble in your country has been the primary goal of the insolvency 
proceedings. 
 
Choose one of the following answers: 




o strongly disagree 
o don’t know 
o no answer 
[Questions 3 and 4 are meant to investigate whether a shift has occurred in the main focus of insolvency proceedings in 
your jurisdiction: has the emphasis shifted from liquidation to rescue? With these questions INSOL wishes to find out if the 
economic crisis did influence those goals in the last two years compared to the period 2004-2007.] 
 
5. How often (approx.) have you advised and assisted businesses in financial trouble since 2004? 
o 0-20  
o 21-50  
o 51-100  
o 101-200  
o > 200  
[Please indicate the number of times that you have been involved (as trustee, administrator, receiver, lawyer, accountant, 
judge, advisor, turnaround manager etc.) in insolvency cases during the last 5 years.]  
 
6. Based on your specific knowledge of cases and experience, were the following reasons significant to the 
rescue of the businesses, apart from seeking the highest return to creditors? 
 
Choose out of the following answers: 
to save employment:    to save tactical/strategic know-how: 
o strongly agree     o     strongly agree   
o agree      o     agree 
o neutral      o     neutral 
o disagree     o     disagree 
o strongly disagree    o     strongly disagree 
o don’t know     o     don’t know 
o no answer     o     no answer 
 
to satisfy politicians/public opinion:  to keep “owner”/management in place: 
o strongly agree     o     strongly agree   
o agree      o     agree 
o neutral      o     neutral 
o disagree     o     disagree 
o strongly disagree    o     strongly disagree 
o don’t know     o     don’t know 




[It is recognised that the main reason for rescuing a business is usually stated in terms of obtaining the best returns for 
creditors. Please indicate what you consider to be the reasons that played a significant role in the attempts to rescue the 
business, apart from seeking the highest return to creditors. Was it aimed at rescuing (local, regional or national) 
employment, retaining valuable (tactical/strategic) know-how, prevention of (local, regional or national) societal unrest or 
distress, due to pressure from politicians, governmental agencies etc. and public opinion (media) or desire of equityholders 
('owners') or management to protect their respective positions? If you consider other reasons important, please indicate 




7. Based on your specific knowledge of cases, the rescue of businesses (either in whole or in part) has been 
mostly successful (i.e. that the business substantially survived its own financial difficulties):  
 
Choose out of the following answers: 
in the following year:    after a couple of years: 
o strongly agree     o     strongly agree   
o agree      o     agree 
o neutral      o     neutral 
o disagree     o     disagree 
o strongly disagree    o     strongly disagree 
o don’t know     o     don’t know 
o no answer     o     no answer 
 
[Please indicate your agreement or otherwise as to the viability of the rescued business in the shorter and longer term. 
Where rescue has been attempted, to what extent do you consider the rescue was sustainable in the next year and then 
also the years thereafter. If in most of your cases the rescue has been successful in one or either period, please indicate so 
as ((strong) agreement; if not, please indicate (strong) disagreement.] 
 
8. Since the beginning of the financial crisis, it has been much more difficult to obtain adequate credit 
facilities to rescue viable financially troubled businesses.  
 
Choose one of the following answers: 




o strongly disagree 
o don’t know 
o no answer 
 
[This question is meant to find out whether you have experienced a shift in position by banks and other financers to provide 
adequate credit facilities during the last year compared to the period 2004-2007.] 
 
9. If you (strongly) agreed with the previous question, please indicate the reason(s) why there has been a 
reluctance to provide adequate financing to businesses in financial distress. 
[With this question we would like to find out why it is difficult to obtain adequate financing for businesses in financial 
distress in your jurisdiction. Is it because there is no adequate legal environment for incentives to provide the availability of 
credit? Or is there a lack of distress asset financiers in your market? Are there any other reasons?] 
 
10. Do you have any other relevant information on this topic you would like to share with INSOL 
International in connection with this survey by INSOL International Academics’ Group? 
[With this question you can inform INSOL about other issues from your practice and jurisdiction that may be worthwhile to 
become known to our researchers. In this connection you may wish to elaborate on question 6 to the extent you referred 
to the option 'Other'.] 
 
11. What topics would you like to be surveyed by INSOL International Academics’ Group next time?  
[Please do not hesitate to help us in this respect with comments, suggestions etc.] 
 
Thank you for your cooperation. Your help by responding to this survey is greatly appreciated. As soon as 
possible afterwards, you will be informed about the results of the survey and the follow-up. 
 
On behalf of INSOL International Academics' Group 
 
Professor Reinout D. Vriesendorp 
Tilburg Law School 
Homepage INSOL International 
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Table 12: Distribution of respondents by country 
 
 Country Responses Percent 
1  United Kingdom *) 95 16,90 
2  Australia *) 89 15,84 
3  Canada 66 11,74 
4  Netherlands 52 9,25 
5  United States *) 37 6,58 
6  New Zealand *) 31 5,52 
7  Hong Kong 29 5,16 
8  South Africa *) 16 2,85 
9  Germany 12 2,14 
10  India 12 2,14 
11  Afghanistan21 10  1,78 
12  Nigeria 9 1,60 
13  Argentina 7 1,25 
14  Brazil 7 1,25 
15  France 7 1,25 
16  Cayman Islands 5 0,89 
17  Ireland 5 0,89 
18  Romania *) 5 0,89 
19  Italy 4 0,71 
20  Poland *) 4 0,71 
21  Sweden 4 0,71 
22  Hungary 3 0,53 
23  Korea Republic of *) 3 0,53 
24  Singapore 3 0,53 
25  Virgin Islands British *) 3 0,53 
26  Austria 2 0,36 
27  Bermuda 2 0,36 
28  China 2 0,36 
29  Denmark 2 0,36 
30  Malaysia 2 0,36 
31  Portugal 2 0,36 
32  Russian Federation 2 0,36 
33  Serbia *) 2 0,36 
34  Spain 2 0,36 
                                                          
21 It is highly unlikely that 10 questionnaires have been completed by INSOL members residing in Afghanistan. In the field of 
quantitative research it is well known that when the question is difficult or time-consuming to answer or there are too 
many questions, some respondents select the first possible option even if not true. In our list of more than 200 countries, 
Afghanistan was the first and easiest choice. Perhaps some of the respondents preferred not to indicate the country where 
they practice or teach law. It is also possible that these are pure technical errors. Regardless of the reason, we will dismiss 
the 10 “Afghan” responses from the analysis where it is linked to a jurisdiction, as it is not possible to connect them to 
particular jurisdiction. Consequently, we base our findings in those cases on a sample n=552. 
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35  Switzerland 2 0,36 
36  Thailand 2 0,36 
37  United Arab Emirates 2 0,36 
38  Uruguay 2 0,36 
39  Azerbaijan 1 0,18 
40  Belgium 1 0,18 
41  Bhutan 1 0,18 
42  Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 0,18 
43  Czech Republic 1 0,18 
44  Estonia 1 0,18 
45  Finland 1 0,18 
46  Japan *) 1 0,18 
47  Kenya 1 0,18 
48  Luxembourg 1 0,18 
49  Mauritius *) 1 0,18 
50  Mexico *) 1 0,18 
51  Nepal 1 0,18 
52  Peru 1 0,18 
53  Qatar 1 0,18 
54  Slovenia *) 1 0,18 
55  Uzbekistan 1 0,18 
56  Venezuela 1 0,18 
Total  562 100,00 
 
*) These countries have adopted and incorporated to some extent in their legislation the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
border Insolvency (1997). 
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Table 13: Distribution by legal system 
Common Law Civil Law  Mixed 
 
United Kingdom Common Law  Netherlands Civil Law  Hong Kong Mixed 
 Australia Common Law  Germany Civil Law  South Africa Mixed 
 Canada Common Law  Argentina Civil Law  India Mixed 
 United States Common Law  Brazil Civil Law  Nigeria Mixed 
 New Zealand Common Law  France Civil Law  Korea Republic of Mixed 
 Cayman Islands Common Law  Romania Civil Law  Singapore Mixed 
 Ireland Common Law  Italy Civil Law  China Mixed 
 Virgin Islands British Common Law  Poland Civil Law  Malaysia Mixed 
 Bermuda Common Law  Sweden Civil Law  United Arab Emirates Mixed 
   Hungary Civil Law  Bhutan Mixed 
   Austria Civil Law  Japan Mixed 
   Denmark Civil Law  Kenya Mixed 
   Portugal Civil Law  Mauritius Mixed 
   Russian Federation Civil Law  Nepal Mixed 
   Serbia Civil Law  Qatar Mixed 
   Spain Civil Law   
   Switzerland Civil Law   
   Thailand Civil Law   
   Uruguay Civil Law   
   Azerbaijan Civil Law   
   Belgium Civil Law   
   Bosnia and Herzegovina Civil Law   
   Czech Republic Civil Law   
   Estonia Civil Law   
   Finland Civil Law   
   Luxembourg Civil Law   
   Mexico Civil Law   
   Peru Civil Law   
   Slovenia Civil Law   
   Uzbekistan Civil Law   
  Venezuela Bolivarian Republic  Civil Law   
 
Computation of index of creditor-friendliness of rescue 
Philip Wood assesses how rescue in 13 jurisdictions affects the interests of the creditors on five 
indicators: impact on security, freeze on set-off, freeze on conflict cancelation, creditor control and 
director liability. Four levels of creditor-friendliness are used to rate the indicators - major impact , 
can be problems, points to watch, usually OK. We give one point for each level of the indicator in the 
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following order: major impact - 1, can be problems - 2, points to watch - 3, usually OK - 4. Thus a 
maximum creditor friendly procedure will score 20 points (5*4) and a minimum is 5 points (5*1). 
Because some of the countries are assessed on less than 5 indicators we use proportion (percentage) 
of the actual score and the total maximum score.  
Philip Wood assesses in his Maps of World Financial Law England as distinct jurisdiction. In our study 
we use UK as unit of analysis. Therefore the score of the table below is only a partial and perhaps 
misleading indicator for the UK.  
Table 14: Indicator of creditor-friendliness of rescue 



















Strongly agree 10,1 17,0 
Agree 38,2 45,5 
Neutral 18,0 12,5 
Disagree 23,6 20,5 
Strongly disagree 10,1 4,5 
 Canada 
Strongly agree 23,4 12,3 
Agree 46,9 53,8 
Neutral 20,3 16,9 
Disagree 6,3 16,9 
Strongly disagree 1,6  
Don't know 1,6  
 Germany 
Strongly agree 33,3 41,7 
Agree 16,7 25,0 
Neutral 25,0 16,7 
Disagree 25,0 16,7 
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 Hong Kong 
Strongly agree 3,4 3,4 
Agree 24,1 31,0 
Neutral 17,2 24,1 
Disagree 51,7 37,9 
Strongly disagree 3,4 3,4 
 India 
Strongly agree 33,3 45,5 
Agree 33,3 27,3 
Neutral 8,3 18,2 
Disagree 16,7  
Strongly disagree 8,3 9,1 
 Netherlands 
Strongly agree 1,9 1,9 
Agree 19,2 19,2 
Neutral 19,2 26,9 
Disagree 44,2 36,5 
Strongly disagree 15,4 15,4 
 New Zealand 
Agree 29,0 45,2 
Neutral 9,7 12,9 
Disagree 48,4 25,8 
Strongly disagree 12,9 16,1 
 South Africa 
Agree 18,8 31,3 
Neutral 12,5 12,5 
Disagree 37,5 37,5 
Strongly disagree 31,3 18,8 
 United Kingdom 
Strongly agree 12,6 12,6 
Agree 54,7 54,7 
Neutral 17,9 16,8 
Disagree 11,6 12,6 
Strongly disagree 2,1 2,1 
Don't know 1,1 1,1 
 United States 
Strongly agree 27,0 16,2 
Agree 51,4 27,0 
Neutral 2,7 18,9 
Disagree 8,1 24,3 
Strongly disagree 8,1 13,5 
Don't know 2,7  
 
